Federal Claims · FTCA
Federal Inmates: Why Your Claim Is Negligence, Not Deliberate Indifference
In June 2025, the Supreme Court heard the case of a man named Andrew Fields. Prison officials at the U.S. Penitentiary in Lee County, Virginia had placed him in solitary confinement, and Fields alleged that during the periodic checks on his cell, officers physically abused him. He sued for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit said his case could go forward. The Supreme Court reversed and held that no such claim exists at all. Not that Fields hadn't proven enough — that federal prisoners have no damages claim for excessive force under the Constitution, full stop.
That case is Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025). If you are a family member trying to get justice for someone in a federal prison, it is the most important thing you need to understand about your options — and almost nobody will explain it to you.
The claim you've probably been told to file
Search for how to sue over abuse in prison and you will find the phrase deliberate indifference everywhere. It's the constitutional standard: officials knew about a serious risk or a serious medical need and disregarded it. It's a demanding test, but it's the one every article describes.
Here's what those articles usually leave out. Deliberate indifference is the standard for state and county prisoners suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 reaches people acting under color of state law. It does not reach federal officers at all.
For federal prisoners, the equivalent claim was never a statute. It came from a 1971 Supreme Court decision, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, in which the Court implied a damages remedy against federal officers directly from the Constitution. For a while it worked. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the mother of Joseph Jones Jr. — who died in federal custody after what she alleged was grossly inadequate medical care — was allowed to bring exactly that kind of claim.
That door has since closed.
How the door closed
The Supreme Court has spent four decades narrowing Bivens, and the language in the recent cases is blunt.
In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the Court collapsed its own test into a single question: is there any reason to think Congress rather than the courts should decide whether a damages remedy exists? And the Court answered its own question in advance — the answer will be Congress in most every case, and where it is, no Bivens action may lie.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring, thought the majority was being coy. He asked when a court could ever be better equipped than elected representatives to weigh the costs and benefits of creating a cause of action, and answered that to ask the question is to answer it. He would have said plainly what the Court was doing indirectly.
Then came Goldey in 2025, applying all of this specifically to federal prisoners. The Court noted it has declined to extend Bivens to new contexts consistently for 45 years, and gave three reasons for refusing again: Congress has legislated actively in prisoner litigation without creating a damages action; allowing excessive-force suits could disrupt the already difficult work of running a prison; and — this is the part that matters most to your family — an alternative remedial structure already exists for federal prisoners.
The Court closed the constitutional door in part because another door is open. Most families never get told which one.
The door that's open: the Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act is how the United States waives its own sovereign immunity and allows itself to be sued for the wrongful acts of federal employees. You are not suing the individual officer. You are suing the United States.
And here is the part that surprises people: the standard is lower.
An FTCA claim is judged under the ordinary negligence law of the state where the harm occurred. Not deliberate indifference. Not a constitutional violation. Negligence — the same standard that governs a car accident or a slip and fall. The question is whether the government met the standard of care a reasonable person would have met, not whether an officer subjectively knew of a serious risk and consciously disregarded it.
Families are often told the constitutional route is the "real" civil rights case and the tort claim is a lesser consolation prize. For a federal inmate, that has it exactly backwards. The constitutional route is largely closed. The tort route is open, and it asks less of you.
What the FTCA covers
Medical negligence. Care that fell below the professional standard — a missed diagnosis, ignored symptoms, medication errors, delayed treatment, failure to follow up. You do not need to prove anyone intended harm or consciously disregarded a risk. You need to show the care was substandard and caused injury.
Assault and battery. This one requires a specific explanation, because the FTCA's general rule appears to bar it. Section 2680(h) excludes most intentional torts from the waiver of immunity. But Congress amended that provision in 1974 to add what's called the law enforcement proviso, which restores liability for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution when committed by federal investigative or law enforcement officers.
Some lower courts had read that narrowly, limiting it to misconduct during a search, seizure, or arrest. In Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013), a case brought by a federal prisoner, the Supreme Court rejected that reading. The proviso is not confined to those activities, and the government conceded in that case that BOP correctional officers qualify as law enforcement officers under the statute. An assault by a correctional officer inside a federal prison can be pursued against the United States.
Premises liability. Unsafe conditions inside the facility — broken stairs, standing water, inadequate lighting, unrepaired hazards, failures of maintenance that a reasonable operator would have addressed. These are ordinary negligence claims, and they are frequently overlooked entirely.
The deadlines that end cases
The FTCA is procedurally strict, and the procedure is where most claims die before anyone examines the facts.
First: two years to present the claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), an administrative claim must be presented to the agency — for federal prisons, the Bureau of Prisons — within two years of when the claim accrues. This is filed on Standard Form 95. This deadline is the one that ends cases, and it runs long before you would ever set foot in a courthouse.
Second: six months for the agency to answer. The agency has six months to respond. In practice it commonly uses the full period. You generally cannot file suit during that window.
Third: six months to file suit. Once the agency denies the claim in writing, you have six months from the mailing of that denial to file in federal district court. Miss it and the claim is gone regardless of its merits.
Two years, then six months, then six months. Write it down.
What this means for your family
If your loved one is in a state or county facility, the deliberate indifference framework still applies and § 1983 is your road.
If your loved one is in a federal facility — a BOP institution, a federal detention center — the constitutional claim you have been reading about is, in practical terms, no longer available to you. The road that remains runs through the Federal Tort Claims Act, and it asks you to prove negligence rather than deliberate indifference.
That is not a downgrade. It is a lower bar on a road that is actually open.
The practical work is the same as it always is: preserve the record, note the dates, get the Standard Form 95 presented inside the two-year window, and have someone experienced look at what happened before a deadline makes the question academic. If you're not sure which category your situation falls into, that's exactly the question worth asking early rather than late.
Primary authorities
- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) — FTCA jurisdiction; liability measured by the law of the place where the act or omission occurred
- 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) — two-year presentment deadline; six months to sue after denial
- 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) — administrative exhaustion requirement; six-month agency response period
- 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) — intentional tort exception and the law enforcement proviso
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — civil action for deprivation of rights under color of state law